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THE ERASURE OF ISLAMIC DIFFERENCE 
IN CANADIAN AND AMERICAN FAMILY 
LAW ADJUDICATION 
Pascale Fournier* 
In Canada, I don’t think we’ve really explored how 
immigration experience changes people, when they move 
from one country to another. It’s easier just to comment 
on different foods and folkloric dances than to really 
understand what people go through when they 
emigrate. . . . In Canada, there has been a tendency to 
trivialize.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Canada and the United States are multicultural societies in 
which cultural differences abound. Yet their dominant cultures 
often control these differences by assimilating them into 
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1 Nino Ricci, Profiles, quoted in NEIL BISSOONDATH, SELLING 
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mainstream norms. This tendency manifests itself in family law 
when judges, while administering complex but vague legal 
notions, apply their own perspectives to individuals who belong 
to culturally-defined minority communities. When courts define 
“the Other”2 by its differences from majoritarian values and 
overlook the experiences of “different” people themselves, they 
rely on and reproduce cultural stereotypes. In this article, I 
expose judicial marginalization of cultural differences in family 
law decisions addressing features of Islamic marriage. 
One must view differences as relational rather than intrinsic. 
They are inventions, not discoveries. Nitya Iyer notes that 
“difference is necessarily a comparative concept. It does not 
inhere in people or things; it expresses a relationship. A thing 
cannot be different in isolation.”3 As adjudicators, judges 
determine who is different and who is normal. In so doing, they 
impose unstated norms against which difference is classified. 
Martha Minow explains the source of these benchmarks: 
“Unstated points of reference may express the experience of a 
majority or may express the perspective of those who have had 
greater access to the power used in naming and assessing 
others.”4 Judicially-administered normalcy, however, subjects 
                                                          
2 I am transposing this term into domestic legal contexts from its classic 
use by Edward Said to describe “the binary typology of advanced and 
backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies.” EDWARD W. SAID, 
ORIENTALISM 206 (Vintage Books 1978). 
3 Nitya Iyer, Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of 
Social Identity, 19 QUEEN’S L.J. 179, 182 (1993) (emphasis added). 
4 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 51 (Cornell University Press 1990). 
Professor Minow adds the following observation: 
“Different” traits are regarded as intrinsic to the “different” person, 
and the norm used to identify difference is assumed to be obvious, 
needing neither statement nor exposure to challenge. Differences are 
presumed identified through an unsituated perspective that makes 
other perspectives irrelevant and sees prevailing social arrangements 
as natural, good, and uncoerced. The chief effect of these 
assumptions is to deposit the problem of difference on the person 
identified by the others as different. Screened out by these 
assumptions are the possibilities that difference expresses patterns of 
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minority cultures to unfavorable comparisons with mainstream 
society, as it is defined by the courts. Jurists need to dislocate 
and displace themselves from such traditional frameworks of 
legal analysis. Only then can they reconceptualize the legal 
stories told in their courtrooms and thus achieve more nuanced 
constructions of cultural minority identities.5 
This article chronicles Canadian and American courts’ 
ignorance of Muslim people’s cultures. I explore the judicial 
discretion to name or refuse to name “Others.” Case law 
demonstrates that judges frequently perceive Muslim cultural 
differences as too drastic to fit within existing legal categories. 
Embedded in these family law decisions are assumptions about 
what constitutes “proper” conduct, values, and practices, that is 
who we are and, by way of opposition, who they are. Unstated 
norms prevail, norms that contribute to the process of 
racialization.6 
In Part I, I examine a 1998 Ontario decision, Kaddoura v. 
Hammoud,7 which renders the particular experiences and 
perspectives of Muslim people invisible at the same time as it 
marks them as the Other. In that case the court refused to require 
payment of the Mahr,8 a Muslim marriage custom, because the 
contract had a religious purpose and thus could not be enforced.9 
I compare this Canadian decision with several American cases 
                                                          
relationships, social perceptions, and the design of institutions made 
by some without others in mind. 
Id. at 79. 
5 See Angela P. Harris, Forward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 
82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 744 (1994). The author argues for a conception of the 
subject as multiplicitous and contingent, one that can be developed by 
disrupting the unity and certainty of modern categories and paradigms. Id. 
6 See generally John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to 
Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 429 (2000) (elaborating 
on how an “unstated norm through most of our history has been the norm of 
Whiteness and maleness.”) 
7 [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
8 The Mahr is a gift from a husband to his wife. It is not a price paid for 
an Islamic marriage, but rather an effect of the contract. 
9 See infra notes 19-46 and accompanying text (providing further 
discussion of this decision). 
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involving the Mahr to assess the implications for multicultural 
societies of different models of judicial attention to culture in 
family law. 
In Part II, I discuss another Islamic religious practice that has 
posed a challenge to Canadian family law, namely the muta,10 a 
temporary institution of marriage found in the Shia Muslim 
tradition. In Y.J. v. N.J.,11 a 1994 child custody dispute over a 
five-year-old girl born in the context of polygamy, an Ontario 
court imposed “traditional” notions of the family instead of 
recognizing the implications of the muta. I explicate the dangers 
inherent in applying majoritarian social norms to a cultural 
minority’s different traditions. More specifically, I analyze the 
case’s legal interpretations of notions such as “best interests of 
the child” and “harm” in light of dominant cultural constructs 
about what is a family in Canadian society. Again, I will 
compare American case law and propose an improved method of 
adjudication. 
The mode of analysis employed in the Mahr and muta cases 
constructs and reifies the Muslim identity that is prevalent in 
Canadian and American courtrooms. It is a product of 
Orientalism,12 a geopolitical mindset that has long conceived a 
                                                          
10 In the Shia sect of Islam, muta is a temporary marriage that is initiated 
by a man. It lasts for a specific period of time and includes a specific amount 
of money or property given to the woman. See Sachiko Murata, Temporary 
Marriage in Islamic Law, available at http://www.al-islam.org/al-serat/muta 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2001). 
11 (1994) O.J. No. 2359. See infra Part II (providing a discussion of the 
court’s treatment of the muta tradition). 
12 For a more in-depth definition of Orientalism as a discourse and a 
system of knowledge and power, see SAID, supra note 2, at 41: 
Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly, and in 
some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive 
together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in 
various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behaviour of 
Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an 
atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and 
even see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular 
characteristics. But like any set of durable ideas, Orientalist notions 
influenced the people who were called Orientals as well as those 
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wide gap between the West and the Orient, the latter 
characterized by its “sensuality, tendency to despotism, aberrant 
mentality, habits of inaccuracy, [and] backwardness.”13 Orientals 
live in that world, while Westerners live in one that is 
industrialized, rational, progressive, and fair.14 This division 
expresses a hostility and lack of similarity between the colonial 
binaries of Us and Them, here and there, West and non-West, 
colonizer and colonized.15 While mainstream society speaks, 
                                                          
called Occidentals, European or Western. . . . If the essence of 
Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western 
supremacy and Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note 
how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened 
and even hardened the distinction. 
SAID, supra note 2, at 41. 
13 SAID, supra note 2, at 205. 
14 See Uma Narayan, Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A 
Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism, 13 HYPATIA 2, 4 (1998). The 
author focuses on Western accounts of other cultures as contingent fictions in 
arguing the following: 
The frequently reiterated contrast between “Western” and “Non-
Western” cultures was a politically motivated colonial construction. 
The self-proclaimed “superiority” of “Western culture” had, 
however, only a faint resemblance to the moral, political, and cultural 
values that actually pervaded life in Western societies. Thus liberty 
and equality could be represented as paradigmatic “Western values,” 
hallmarks of its civilizational superiority, at the very moment when 
Western nations were engaged in slavery, colonization, expropriation, 
and the denial of liberty and equality not only to the colonized but to 
large segments of Western subjects, including women. Profound 
similarities between Western culture and many of its Others, such as 
hierarchical social systems, huge economic disparities between 
members, and the mistreatment and inequality of women, were 
systematically ignored in this construction of “Western culture.” 
Id. 
15 See SAID, supra note 2, at 45. Professor Said makes the following 
observation: 
When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the 
starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy, the 
result is usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes 
more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human 
encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In 
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writes, and reifies Oriental cultural identity, the subject of 
attention, the “Oriental” man or woman created, is viewed and 
judged as the exotic Other. 
This identity imposition fails because the Other, who appears 
in and exists through her difference, who is the object and 
fascination of the West, can hardly be reduced to something 
recognizable or familiar to the observer’s eyes. As a result, the 
“logic of identity” denies or represses difference. As Iris Marion 
Young argues, “reducing the heterogeneity of sensuous 
particulars to the unity of thought” leads to “a relentless logic of 
identity [that] seeks to reduce the plurality of particular subjects, 
their bodily, perspectival experience, to a unity, by measuring 
them against the unvarying standard of universal reason.”16 
Ironically, by attempting to contain differences within a unified 
rubric, courts turn the different subject into the absolute Other. 
Universalism collapses into dualism. 
The decisions I analyze in this article promote a judicial ideal 
of impartiality and universality by treating each person as an 
unencumbered individual, ignoring religion and culture as 
constitutive traits. Muslim women become monumentalized 
objects, frozen and fixed eternally through the colonial gaze17 of 
                                                          
short, from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a 
form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the 
altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-
and-fast distinctions as “East” and “West”: to channel thought into a 
West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the 
center of Orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West, 
the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as 
having the status of scientific truth. 
SAID, supra note 2, at 45. Western thought has produced many mutually 
exclusive oppositions: subject/object, mind/body, good/bad, pure/impure. The 
first side of this dichotomy, considered the unified and the self-identical, is 
elevated over the second, which designates the chaotic and the unformed. See 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 99 
(Princeton University Press 1990). 
16 Young, supra note 15, at 99. 
17 I borrow this term from Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on 
Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 525 (1997). 
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judges without any account of their own perspective of what it 
means to be Muslim, “Oriental,” and different. These female 
litigants’ personhood disappears during the majoritarian legal 
decision-making process. In denying their claims, judges display 
an impoverished understanding of what culture and religion are, 
how they differ, and why they matter. 
I.  KADDOURA V. HAMMOUD AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF ISLAMIC 
MARRIAGE CONTRACTS: DANGEROUS CROSSING! 
“Dangerous Crossing”; it’s painted on signboards all 
over the world!18 
A. The Canadian Religious Thicket 
In Kaddoura v. Hammoud,19 religion played a pivotal role in 
the Ontario Court of Justice’s decision not to enforce the 
obligation to pay a Mahr, an amount of $30,000 due to the wife 
under an Islamic marriage contract. In so holding, the court 
participated in a cultural encounter,20 but found that people from 
minority groups should resolve their religious conflicts among 
themselves and with the advice of their God, not our judicial 
system. 
This case is the story of Sam and Manira.21 They were 
                                                          
18 See WILLA CATHER, THE PROFESSOR’S HOUSE 247 (Knopf 1925), 
available at http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/p/pd-modeng/pd-modeng-idx?type 
=header&byte=8337423. 
19 [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
20 Following release of his judgment, Judge Rutherford acknowledged the 
significance of the case for the Muslim community. In Kaddoura v. 
Hammoud, (1999) O.J. No. 172, a judgment concerning costs, he stated: 
The issue of the Mahr obligation was an interesting one and said by 
counsel on both sides to be of importance broadly within the Muslim 
communities in this country. I would estimate that about 75% of the 
trial itself related to the issue. It was an important issue to litigate, 
going beyond the interests of the parties themselves. 
Id. 
21 Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.) 
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nineteen and twenty years old respectively when they became 
engaged.22 They had been dating, secretly, because this is not 
permitted for young Muslim men and women.23 At the wedding, 
Sam, Manira and their official witnesses signed both the 
documents necessary pursuant to the province of Ontario’s 
requirements24 and a Muslim marriage certificate, written in 
Arabic.25 The parties were married only eighteen months. Their 
relationship was stormy, and Manira moved back to her parents’ 
home several times.26 Shortly after the last incident, Sam served 
her with a divorce petition. Judgment for divorce was granted.27 
In Manira’s counter-petition, she sought damages of $30,000 to 
which she claimed she was entitled as payment of the Mahr.28 
Sam had paid $5,000 before the marriage and deferred payment 
of an additional $30,000.29 In his testimony, Sam said he knew 
that $30,000 was the amount of the deferred portion of the Mahr, 
but he said he never understood that he would be compelled to 
pay it.30 Sam testified that his sister had divorced and that she 
was unable to collect the deferred portion of the Mahr that was 
due to her.31 
According to Section 52(1) of Ontario’s Family Law Act, a 
man and a woman who are married to each other or intend to 
marry may enter into an agreement on their respective rights and 
obligations during the marriage or on separation.32 For an 
agreement to be enforced, the first issue to be determined by a 
court is whether there is an agreement of a binding nature 
                                                          
22 Id. at ¶ 11. 
23 Id. 
24 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F-3 § 28(1) (2) (1990) (Can.). 
25 Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶ 18. 
26 Id. at ¶¶ 1-5. 
27 Id. at ¶ 6. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at ¶15. 
30 Id. at ¶ 16. 
31 Id. 
32 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F-3 (1990), amended by ch. 32, § 12, 
1992 S.O.; ch. 27, sched., 1993 S.O.; ch. 25, sched. E, § 1, 1997 S.O.; ch. 
26, § 102 1997 S.O.; ch. 6, § 25, 1999 S.O (Can.). 
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between the parties. A court will consider whether they freely 
and willingly entered into the agreement.33 In Kaddoura v. 
Hammoud, both Sam and Manira acknowledged the agreement as 
to the Mahr.34 Further, no evidence showed that the provision 
requiring the payment of $30,000 was vague or that the 
agreement was signed under circumstances suggestive of 
inequality, improvidence, or duress. Despite the obligatory 
nature of the Mahr under Islamic principles, however, the judge 
held that the agreement was not enforceable by Canadian courts. 
In resolving the issue, the judge considered cultural evidence 
in order to define the content of Muslim marriages solemnized in 
Canada.35 Two experts, the imam of a mosque36 in Ottawa, and 
the director of the Institute of Islamic Learning in Ajax, Ontario, 
also an imam and scholar of Islam, expounded in their testimony 
on the nature of the Mahr.37 According to evidence relied upon 
by the court, the Mahr consists of “a gift or contribution made by 
the husband-to-be to his wife-to-be, for her exclusive property. It 
is not, however, a gift in the sense that a gift is given by the 
grace of the giver, but in fact ‘Mahr’ is obligatory and the wife-
to-be receives it as of right.”38 David Pearl and Werner Menski, 
in Muslim Family Law, confirm that the Mahr is a right of the 
wife: “More commonly some of the dower (Mahr), if not the 
entire amount, will be deferred. It is then payable on the 
dissolution of the marriage by divorce or death, or on the 
happening of a specified event.”39 Pearl and Menski agree that 
                                                          
33 See generally Belanger v. Belanger, (1995) O.J. No. 1195; Griffioen v. 
Bickley (1993) O.J. No. 3027. 
34 Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶¶ 16, 20. 
35 Id. at ¶14. 
36 The “imam” is the leader of congregational prayer performed in the 
mosque. See generally Encyclopaedia of the Orient, at http://www.lexicorient. 
com/e.o/index.htm. Any Muslim trained in the prayer can be the imam. Id. In 
general, the honor is given to the most respected person in the assembly. Id. 
In modern times, mosques have elevated the imam into an employed leader, 
religious adviser and spokesperson for the congregation. Id. 
37 Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶ 14. 
38 Id. at ¶13 (emphasis added). 
39 DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 180 
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only in two situations will the wife lose her entitlement to the 
Mahr—”[f]irst, if the marriage is dissolved by the husband before 
consummation, in various situations akin to annulment [and,] 
[s]econdly, if the marriage is dissolved by an action of the wife 
before consummation. . . .”40 
Instead of considering this context, however, the court kept 
its distance from any doctrinal investigation of the Mahr: 
Both experts said that while Mahr was in the nature of a 
right held by a Muslim wife, she could, by certain 
conduct or in certain circumstances, disentitle herself to 
it. While Dr. Gamal was less emphatic on the point than 
was Mufti Khan, the latter advised that any dispute over 
the obligation of the Mahr was a matter to be determined 
by religious authorities. In any event, both experts agreed 
that any such dispute was to be resolved according to 
Islamic religious principles.41 
At the same time, the Ontario Court of Justice specifically 
found the Mahr to be obligatory, that it is a right granted to the 
wife and a component of Islamic marriage. On the evidence put 
before it, the court was satisfied that the agreement was freely 
made. The judge’s reasoning reveals that it is the religious 
dimension of the Mahr that rendered the agreement 
unenforceable: 
While not, perhaps, an ideal comparison, I cannot help 
but think that the obligation of the Mahr is as unsuitable 
for adjudication in the civil courts as is an obligation in a 
                                                          
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998). Jamal J. Nasir, in his book THE ISLAMIC 
LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 98 (London: Graham & Trotman, 1990), is of the 
same opinion. 
40 Pearl & Menski, supra note 39, at 180. I note in addition that a khul 
divorce is one in which a wife sues for divorce even though the husband has 
not misbehaved. If a wife simply wishes to end the marriage, the husband may 
agree to grant her the divorce if she returns all or part of the Mahr. See 
Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract in American Courts, Paper 
presented to the Minaret of Freedom Banquet (May 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.minaret.org/azizah.htm [hereinafter al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage 
Contract]. 
41 Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶14. 
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Christian religious marriage, such as to love, honour and 
cherish, or to remain faithful, or to maintain the marriage 
in sickness or other adversity so long as both parties live, 
or to raise children according to specified religious 
doctrine. Many such promises go well beyond the basic 
legal commitment to marriage required by our civil law, 
and are essentially matters of chosen religion and 
morality. They are derived from and are dependent upon 
doctrine and faith. They bind the conscience as a matter 
of religious principle but not necessarily as a matter of 
enforceable civil law.42 
Tellingly, and erroneously, the judge imports a Christian, 
majoritarian comparison with the Islamic institution of the Mahr. 
He overlooks the fact that, whereas Christian vows constitute 
moral obligations that are indefinite insofar as they can only bind 
the conscience, the Mahr is a financial obligation. The court’s 
message is that a valid agreement between two Muslim parties is 
unenforceable, not for vagueness like the Christian examples 
deemed analogous, but because of the agreement’s religious 
purpose. 
Closer scrutiny demonstrates that the “morality” objection is 
of scant substance. Exclusion of Muslim marriage contracts from 
the scope of judicial power is, according to the subtext of the 
decision, based on apparent cultural anxiety. The judge felt that 
he had no authority, as a non-Islamic adjudicator, to speak or 
write about the Other: 
I don’t think, even if I had received clear and complete 
Islamic doctrine from these experts, that I could, as if 
applying foreign law, apply such religious doctrine to a 
civil resolution of this dispute. . . . Mufti Khan in 
particular, said that only an Islamic religious authority 
could resolve such a dispute.43 
Moreover, the court feared that venturing down a path of 
religious doctrine would involve untold dangers: 
                                                          
42 Id. at ¶ 25. 
43 Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28. 
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In my view, to determine what the rights and obligations 
of Sam and Manira are in relation to the undertaking of 
Mahr in their Islamic marriage ceremony would 
necessarily lead the Court into the “religious thicket,” a 
place that the courts cannot safely and should not go.44 
By holding a valid agreement made between Muslim people 
unenforceable because it is based on Islamic rules, the court 
valued and enforced homogeneity. Some people are allowed to 
participate in the construction of Canadian identity; some are not. 
Some cultures’ institutions are identified with universality; some 
are not. Iris Marion Young has powerfully argued this point: 
The dominant group reinforces its position by bringing the 
other groups under the measure of the dominant 
norms. . . . Since only the dominant group’s cultural 
expressions receive wide dissemination, their [sic] cultural 
expressions become the normal, or the universal, and 
thereby the unremarkable. Given the normality of its own 
cultural expressions and identity, the dominant group 
constructs the differences which some groups exhibit as 
lack and negation.45 
In the colonial gaze of the court, Manira sees a reflection of 
herself as a Muslim woman who is limited to beseeching her own 
people for recognition. The distinctive character of the Muslim 
community is threatening to the court. The judge refused to 
endorse difference, for to do so would lead him into the 
“religious thicket” where majoritarian norms are unknown and 
without currency, where familiar rules do not function as usual, 
and where law has to step outside its comfortable doctrinal 
reference points. Not safe, said the court; therefore, not good and 
not enforceable. By abstaining from the use of its powers to 
compel enforcement in this case, the court compels minorities to 
conform to the power structure of the culturally-privileged 
majority. The norm is vindicated. 
Had Manira and Sam made the same agreement in the 
absence of the disturbing Muslim ethos, the court would likely 
                                                          
44 Id. at ¶ 28 (emphasis added). 
45 Young, supra note 15, at 59. 
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have confirmed the will of the parties. Indeed, in his judgment 
for costs of the action, Judge Rutherford acknowledged the 
unfairness of such legal reasoning, that is his legal reasoning: 
While I drew a boundary between a debt enforceable in 
civil law and the obligation of the Mahr, it nonetheless 
seems to me somewhat offensive and dishonourable on the 
part of Mr. Kaddoura, to knowingly participate in the 
wedding customs and practices of his Muslim community, 
including the Mahr which he clearly knew included a 
“written” or deferred amount of $30,000, and then 
eschew those customs and practices when they worked to 
his financial detriment.46 
These equities, however, did not affect the legal outcome; thus, 
in Canada payment of the Mahr lacks backing from the courts. 
B. Gazing Across the Border: The American Experience with 
the Mahr 
The judge in Kaddoura v. Hammoud treated the legal 
question of enforcing the Mahr as one of first impression. Had he 
looked at American case law, however, precedents would have 
presented themselves. Indeed, one trial court decision in New 
York reached the opposite result in precisely the same 
circumstances, using an identical universalist approach. In Aziz v. 
Aziz, a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court of New York held that 
“[t]he document at issue conforms to the requirements of the 
General Obligations Law . . . and its secular terms are 
enforceable as a contractual obligation, notwithstanding that it 
was entered into as part of a religious ceremony.”47 Although the 
Mahr debt was paid to the Muslim wife in this case, by using the 
word “conforms” the court failed to be culturally sensitive. It 
asked from a majoritarian perspective whether the Islamic 
                                                          
46 Kaddoura, (1999) O.J. No. 172, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added) (regarding 
costs, $1,500 was awarded to Sam). 
47 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); see also N.Y. GEN. 
OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(3) (requiring that agreements in consideration of 
marriage be made in writing). 
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marriage contract fit into a legal category. The judge made no 
attempt to gain an internal appreciation of the role of the Mahr in 
a Muslim couple’s wedding and subsequent relationship. 
Interestingly, the judgment in Aziz was based on a 1983 decision 
of the Court of Appeals, the highest state court of New York, 
concerning a Jewish marriage contract, or ketubah.48 In this case, 
Avitzur v. Avitzur, four of seven judges applied what they called 
“neutral principles of contract law”49 to avoid the religious 
thicket feared by the three dissenters, who refused to engage 
questions that, in their view, implicated “Jewish religious law 
and tradition.”50 
The insular perspective of the New York courts can just as 
easily lead to a different conclusion, as was the case in 1988 
when a California appellate court decided In re Marriage of 
Dajani.51 This decision attempted to fit the Mahr into the legal 
category of prenuptial agreements and found those that “facilitate 
divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in the 
event of such an occurrence . . . void as against public policy.”52 
Whereas the classification approach used by the Kaddoura 
and Aziz courts to refer to a Muslim practice using North 
American legal categories was fundamentally universalist, other 
courts have demonstrated a strong cultural relativist tendency. 
This relativist method is based on the idea that there is a single 
truth to be found in Islamic law; the approach mirrors the 
universalists’ quest for absolute verities in Western legal 
doctrine. For instance, the trial judge in Dajani heard expert 
testimony and, in finding against the woman’s claim, held that 
“the law in existence would be that of the Jordanian or Moslem 
law, and . . . if the wife initiates a termination of the 
                                                          
48 Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 124. It is noteworthy that the California case 
that I discuss next, In re Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), 
also drew on a precedent addressing a ketubah dispute. See In re Marriage of 
Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
49 58 N.Y.2d 108, 115 (1983) (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 119. 
51 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
52 Id. at 872 (quoting In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 295 
(Cal. 1973)). 
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relationship, she forgoes the dowry and common sense and 
wisdom of Mohamed would dictate that she forgo the dowry.”53 
Another example of a court adopting the relativist approach 
can be found in Akileh v. Elchahal, a Florida case in which the 
judge, as noted on appeal, found that the sadaq (equivalent to a 
Mahr) “was meant to protect the wife from an unwanted divorce. 
As such, the trial court would not order the husband to pay the 
wife the postponed sadaq since the wife was ‘the one who chose 
to pursue the divorce.’”54 This line of reasoning comports with 
the khul form of divorce, in which “the wife tells the husband ‘I 
want to leave you; take your mahr and go.’”55 But the judge 
ignored the principle of darar (meaning cruelty or harm): 
There is an exception to the rule; a woman can seek 
judicial divorce for harm . . . without losing her delayed 
mahr. The husband need not physically torture her; under 
Jordanian law, under Kuwaiti law, just verbal abuse is 
sufficient. . . . In this case the husband transmitted 
venereal disease to the woman, and therefore the harm 
was clearly established.56 
Even though the Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
judgment awarding the female claimant $50,000, the court’s 
reasoning contained a misleading blend of universalism and 
cultural relativism. Ostensibly relying on Aziz and neutral 
contract law principles (but omitting the fact that in Aziz the wife 
was awarded a divorce decree based on constructive 
abandonment), the court nonetheless strayed from the universalist 
course and ventured into the interpretation of Islamic law. It was 
presented with the following contradictory evidence: 
At trial four witnesses testified as to the meaning of the 
Islamic [sic] word “sadaq.” The wife’s Islamic expert, 
Mazi Najjar, testified that generally a sadaq is similar to 
the concept of a dowry. He stated that only the wife could 
waive her right to receive the postponed portion of the 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 666 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
55 See al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 20. 
56 Al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 14. 
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sadaq. Najjar said that the wife’s right to receive the 
sadaq was not negated if the wife filed for divorce. 
The wife testified that a wife’s right to receive the 
postponed portion of the sadaq was absolute and not 
affected by the cause of a divorce. The wife stated that the 
exception was that a wife would forfeit the dowry if she 
cheated on her husband. The wife was unaware of any 
other instances in which the sadaq would be forfeited. 
Raju Akileh, the wife’s father, also testified that the 
postponed portion of the sadaq is an absolute right of a 
wife to request from the husband whenever she wished 
and especially in the event of divorce. 
The husband testified that he believed the postponed 
portion of the sadaq was forfeited if the wife chose to 
divorce her husband. The husband’s understanding of the 
sadaq stemmed from his sister’s experience. His sister 
had previously sought a divorce and then pursued the 
postponed sadaq. An Islamic court ruled that she was not 
entitled to receive the sadaq since she had wanted the 
divorce. However, the husband testified that a woman 
seeking a divorce is entitled to her sadaq if she is abused. 
The husband admitted that he had never discussed the 
meaning of sadaq with the wife or her father.57 
The court, while basing its decision on principles of contract 
law, showed a disposition to believe the testimony of Ms. 
Akileh’s side, stating that “[a]t no time did the husband make 
known his unique understanding of a sadaq either during his 
negotiations with the wife’s father or prior to signing the 
certificate of marriage.”58 Ironically, even the husband’s 
definition contained the very principle of darar that could have 
decided the case against him. 
The various incompatible interpretations of the sadaq in this 
                                                          
57 Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 247-48 (emphasis added). I note a parallel to 
Kaddoura, where Sam testified that his sister had been divorced and was 
unable to collect the deferred portion of the Mahr that was due to her. See 
Kaddoura, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503, at ¶16. 
58 Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 249 (emphasis added). 
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Florida dispute demonstrate the dangers involved when courts 
attempt to establish conclusive tenets of Islamic law. Regarding a 
case in Virginia, Azizah al-Hibri of the University of Richmond 
School of Law reported that: 
On one occasion a well-known Islamic scholar said to me, 
“Mahr is the bride price.” This is abhorrent. It is my 
suspicion that it is such testimony that [a Virginia judge] 
heard in his court that led him to say “slavery is over in 
the U.S., if Islamic marriage law says women are sold 
into marriage, then we will not enforce it in this 
country.”59 
Professor al-Hibri is wary of expert testimony, which was also 
present in the Ontario judgment in Kaddoura: 
Many Muslim men, whether imams of mosques or 
professors of religion, are not sufficiently familiar with 
Islamic law. Often, they confuse their cultural beliefs and 
practices with Islam itself. An American judge has no 
way of discerning the difference in the absence of more 
reliable sources of information. If I am a non-Muslim 
American judge and a Muslim expert witness, a Muslim 
professor of Islam (how more reliable can an expert 
witness be?) or the imam of a masjid [mosque] walks into 
my court, then I am inclined to believe that I am going to 
get the real story. But that is not always the case.60 
A California court recently added the following caution: 
[E]ven the term “Islamic law” is relatively uncertain. 
There are at least four schools of interpretation of Islamic 
law: the Shafi’i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. . . . The 
legal system in various Islamic countries will often be 
influenced by one school or the other. . . . Egypt, for 
example, has been influenced by both the Hanafi and 
Maliki schools. . . . Indeed, one commentator has 
observed that England has rejected any attempt to give 
effect to Islamic “personal law” because of the varieties 
                                                          
59 Al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 17. 
60 Al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 17. 
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of competing schools within Islam.61 
The monolithic vision of Islamic law that most judges reveal is 
part of the Orientalist fallacy. As Edward Said has aptly stated: 
“‘We’ are this, ‘they’ are that. Which Arab, which Islam, when, 
how, according to what test: these appear to be irrelevant 
distinctions.”62 
Both universalist and cultural relativist approaches engage in 
an overly narrow exercise of the judicial role. The universalist 
makes no effort to go beyond the familiar legal categories of 
contract or divorce law. The cultural relativist abdicates the 
responsibility of arbitrating legal disputes, substituting the 
opinion of a male imam or a probably male professor. Irony lies 
in relativism’s application of a single perspective, which is 
elevated uncritically and given universal application. Dianne Otto 
has appositely described a dual task to expose “the cultural 
allegiances and imperialist potential of the universalist 
arguments, [and to bring] to light the narrowness of the diversity 
promoted by the cultural relativist position.”63 
I propose a third method, what I call the functional approach 
to minority cultures’ interactions with the majoritarian legal 
system. This approach aims to transcend the impasse between 
universalism and cultural relativism, a struggle that can 
disempower those who are intersectionally marginalized in both 
hierarchies: 
In turning away from the discourse and images of self as 
the stereotyped Muslim woman, individual women turn 
toward either the colonizer/West or Islam for affirmation. 
Instead of affirmation, however, they find devaluations 
and apprehension in the former (Orientalism) and 
mechanisms for their control in the latter (Islamism).64 
                                                          
61 In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 869 n.4 (2001). I am 
much obliged to Ann Laquer Estin for pointing out this case. 
62 SAID, supra note 2, at 237. 
63 Dianne Otto, Rethinking the Universality of Human Rights Law, 29 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38 (1997). 
64 SHAHNAZ KHAN, MUSLIM WOMEN: CRAFTING A NORTH AMERICAN 
IDENTITY 3 (University Press of Florida 2000). For a discussion of “the 
FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC 2/21/02 7:41 PM 
 CULTURE IN FAMILY LAW ADJUDICATION 69 
Functionalism has its origins in legal anthropology, 
particularly in the work of Bronislaw Malinowski.65 As described 
by Annelise Riles: 
Malinowski’s empiricism, defined in opposition to what 
Malinowski saw as an earlier generation’s conjecture 
about historical evolutionary processes, emphasized a kind 
of relational reasoning: “The explanations here given 
consisted in an analysis of certain facts into simpler 
elements and of tracing the relations between these 
elements.” The subject matter of Malinowski’s discovery, 
then, was the cultural context of law rather than a set of 
rules. . . .66 
In the spirit of the functional approach, we should encourage 
cultural repositioning and enlightened engagement in courtrooms. 
After they find threshold conformity to legally recognized 
contractual forms (the absence of problems such as vagueness 
and duress), judges confronted with the issue of Mahr 
enforcement should address the central question of the Mahr’s 
role in a Muslim marriage. This involves a more complex inquiry 
than simply asking what the result of a dispute would be under 
Islamic law.67 
Functionalist judges should take notice of social context and 
cultural diversity, “realiz[ing] that they can only discharge their 
democratic responsibilities to a nation that is culturally rich and 
                                                          
paradox of multicultural vulnerability” describing the effect of law on 
intragroup power relations for groups such as Muslim women, see Ayelet 
Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of 
Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 386 (2000). 
65 See generally ADAM KUPER, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS: 
THE MODERN BRITISH SCHOOL 1-35 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983) (devoting 
a chapter to the works of Malinowski). 
66 Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the 
Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 603 (1994) (quoting 
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 127-28 
(1926)). 
67 We have seen the fallacy of a unitary concept of Islamic law due to the 
fact that different Islamic countries follow distinct interpretations of legal 
issues such as Mahr payment. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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ideologically diverse by demonstrating that they have considered 
a full range of perspectives and resources in arriving at their 
results.”68 This mode of dispute resolution is an extremely 
promising candidate to be a guiding principle for adjudication in 
multicultural societies. Professor Riles notes the following: 
The legal text, rule, or decision . . . cannot be understood 
without considering the totality of cultural factors that 
give it meaning. . . . “The various official discourses of 
law deal primarily with rules whose application 
transcends, at least in theory, differences in personal and 
social status. In striking contrast to this focus on legal 
rules, lay litigants speak often about personal values, 
social relations, and broad conceptions of fairness and 
equity in seeking resolution of their difficulties through 
legal channels.”69 
Functionalism prevents the privileging of legal form over cultural 
context. 
A judge could look behind the religious nature of the Mahr to 
ask what its purpose is in a marriage, and what values, such as 
                                                          
68 Shalin M. Sugunasiri, Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New 
Standard of Judicial Analysis and Accountability, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 126, 
174 (1999). 
69 Riles, supra note 66, at 636 (quoting JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. 
O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 1 (1990)); see also Charles R. Lawrence, The Word and the River: 
Pedagogy as Scholarship and Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2278-79 
(1992): 
Litigation is highly formalized storytelling. . . . But the law’s 
tradition of storytelling is very different from the African tradition. 
Where our tradition values rich contextual detail, the law excludes 
large parts of the story as irrelevant. Where we seek to convey the 
full range and depth of feeling, the law asks us to disregard emotions. 
Where we celebrate the specific and the personal, the law tells stories 
about disembodied “reasonable men.” . . . We remain invisible and 
unheard in the literature that is the evidentiary database for legal 
discourse, and when we are seen, in stories told by others, our 
images are severely distorted by the lenses of fear, bias, and 
misunderstanding. 
Id. 
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trust, respect, and financial independence are promoted by its 
enforcement.70 This would shed considerable light on the question 
of enforceability as a matter of public policy. Islamic law experts 
could be helpful in describing the institution and its traditions, 
but the voice of the Muslim woman would become indispensable, 
rather than silenced. Only she can contextualize the role of the 
Mahr from a female perspective and make vivid the benefits and 
burdens of her Islamic marriage. The functional approach has the 
advantage of taking an internal vantage point on cultural practices 
and investigating their contours, rather than focusing on their 
difference and lack of familiarity. This type of analysis invites 
resistance to the imposition of majoritarian norms. 
Part II will continue my examination of the dangers inherent 
in applying the dominant society’s values to a cultural minority’s 
traditions. In this case study of Islamic temporary marriage or 
muta, law constructs and reinforces notions of the “normal 
family.”71 
II. Y.J. V. N.J.: THE BEST INTERESTS OF WHOSE CHILD? 
White norms prevail, but in an unspoken form. Instead, 
they are characterized as positive social norms thereby 
legitimising hegemony.72 
 
The “best interests of the child” is the standard for awarding 
                                                          
70 See al-Hibri, Muslim Marriage Contract, supra note 40, at para. 28 
(describing “two basic Islamic legal concepts[:] a married Muslim woman is 
legally entitled to her financial independence [and] the husband is obligated to 
support his wife.”). There will be some components of Islamic law that courts 
are reluctant to enforce based on public policy concerns. See Amin v. 
Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75, 83-85 (La. 2001) (reviewing American cases that 
have refused on public policy grounds to recognize Islamic family law rulings 
on child custody). 
71 For elaboration of this concept, see Lori G. Beaman, Sexual 
Orientation and Legal Discourse: Legal Constructions of the “Normal” 
Family, 14 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 173 (1999). 
72 Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking: A Chicago Perspective, 24 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1193, 1222 (1991). 
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custody in Canada73 and the United States. In an attempt to repair 
the world of children in custody determinations, courts have 
judicial discretion to predict and to determine what would be the 
best possible arrangement for a child. Yet because of the broad 
discretion inherent in the standard, the very use of the best 
interests test sometimes produces results that ignore notions of 
identity, religion, belonging, and group affiliation. These 
incomplete decisions beg the question of whose perspective is 
taken when we attempt to ascertain the best interests to be 
served. 
Y.J. v. N.J.74 was a Canadian decision determining the 
custody of S, a five-year old Muslim girl. The case demonstrates 
the problems inherent in the deployment of the purportedly 
objective best interests test. By insisting on the stability of the 
custodial family, the court refused to engage the unusual 
circumstances that gave rise to the dispute: the fact that a 
Canadian child was born as the result of a Muslim man’s 
simultaneous second marriage. By emphasizing the best interests 
of the child without giving sufficient attention to the religious and 
cultural context in which she was born, the Ontario Court of 
Justice failed to incorporate significant elements in determining 
the “harm” at issue. 
A. Muta: Her Story 
Y.J. (“Y”) was born in Uganda and came to Canada when 
she was five years old.75 She was raised in the Shia Muslim 
tradition in Edmonton, Alberta.76 In 1985, when she was 
eighteen, she fell in love with N.J. (“N”), who was then thirty-
five years old and had been married to S.J. since 1979.77 N, also 
                                                          
73 See Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 24 (1990) 
(Can.). 
74 (1994) O.J. No. 2359. 
75 Id. at ¶ 3. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3. 
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a Shia Muslim, was born in Zaire and came to Canada in 1974.78 
He and Y entered into several temporary marriages, called muta79 
in the Islamic law recognized by the Shia tradition.80 During this 
time they lived and traveled together.81 S.J. was aware of her 
husband’s first temporary marriage to Y in 1985.82 At the time of 
the second temporary marriage in 1988, while Y was pregnant 
with their child, N put an end to the muta.83 Within two weeks of 
S’s birth, Y was ordered out of her uncle’s home because she had 
disgraced her relatives.84 This was the first time that a child had 
been born of a temporary marriage into Y’s family.85 
On July 21, 1989, Y signed an agreement transferring 
custody of S to her father, and on July 24, 1989, Mr. Justice 
Roslak in the Court of Queens Bench of Alberta issued an order 
granting N exclusive custody of the child.86 Y and N, however, 
had entered into a secret collateral oral agreement, providing that 
he would have custody of S for a period of only three years and 
that S would then be returned to her mother.87 In his testimony, 
N acknowledged this arrangement.88 Meanwhile, S became part 
of N’s family and was raised as one of their own.89 She was 
unaware that S.J. was not her biological mother or that N’s other 
children were her half brothers.90 Even though Y did not see her 
                                                          
78 Id. at ¶ 11. 
79 Muta is a Shia institution of temporary marriage allowing a Muslim 
man to marry a woman for a fixed term. Sunni Muslims consider muta to be 
irregular. The essential characteristics of the muta marriage are specification 
of a dower and a finite term of cohabitation. The husband retains the option to 
cancel at any time by “making a gift of the term.” See Murata, supra note 10. 
80 Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 2. 
81 Id. at ¶ 3 
82 Id. at ¶ 13. 
83 Id. at ¶ 3. 
84 Id. at ¶ 5. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 17. 
87 Id. at ¶ 6. 
88 Id. at ¶ 7. 
89 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 7. 
90 Id. at ¶ 1. 
FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC 2/21/02 7:41 PM 
74 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
daughter during this time, she obtained a private mailbox and N 
forwarded her video and audio tapes of S.91 Also, when his wife 
was not at home, he would let Y talk to S on the telephone as if 
she were her aunt.92 
On June 3, 1993, Y obtained an ex parte order in the Court 
of Queens Bench of Alberta granting her reasonable access to S 
subject to a trial in the province of Ontario.93 In the late summer 
of 1993, she came to Toronto and entered into a third temporary 
marriage with N.94 She also requested a visit with her daughter, 
but when N, with S.J. present in the next room, told her that it 
was only possible for one day, she protested.95 Because N and 
S.J. threatened to take the child to Tanzania, their home country, 
Y brought an application for custody under the Children’s Law 
Reform Act96 on September 20, 1993.97 In her testimony, Y 
specified that she was only asking for access to S as her 
biological mother and did not want to interfere with N and S.J.’s 
parenting.98 If she were to claim custody, it would be because N 
and S.J. wanted to take S to Africa, circumstances under which 
Y would perhaps never see her daughter again.99 
In the fall of 1993, consideration was given to returning S to 
her mother.100 The respondents arranged for S.J., her sister and S 
to visit Edmonton for this purpose.101 During their stay, Y visited 
with S on seven to nine different occasions, some in S.J.’s 
presence, others not. Y stated that S had no hesitation in going 
with her and enjoyed her visits, particularly the five hours she 
was with her while they watched a New Year’s parade.102 S.J., 
                                                          
91 Id. at ¶ 7. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at ¶ 8. 
95 Id. 
96 R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 24 (1990) (Can.). 
97 Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 8. 
98 Id. at ¶ 10. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at ¶ 9. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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according to Y’s testimony, was very hostile towards her and told 
her that sharing S was not an option.103 S.J. announced that either 
Y could take S or else she and N would return to Africa with 
S.104 The custodial transfer never took place since N testified that 
he and his wife could not part with S.105 
On July 11, 1994, the Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Y’s 
application for custody. It held that the respondents were very 
competent parents and that any intrusion, particularly the 
introduction of access into a stable family, would create a 
potential for harm to S.106 In the official text of the decision, the 
court stated that the situation at bar was rarely encountered in 
custody and access cases because Y and S had not developed any 
relationship.107 The subtext, however, has a different flavor. My 
following analysis illustrates the underlying assumptions upon 
which the Y.J. v. N.J. decision was framed, examined and 
resolved. Moreover, I scrutinize legal notions such as “best 
interests of the child” and “harm” as they were applied in the 
unfamiliar context of a muta marriage. 
B. The Best Interests of the Child: The Nuclear Family as 
Unstated Norm 
Best Interests employs a particular, narrow and static 
image of the child.108 
 
Section 24(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act109 requires 
that the merits of an application for custody of a child be 




106 Id. at ¶ 14. 
107 Id. at ¶ 16. 
108 Michael Freeman, Is The Best Interests of the Child in the Best 
Interest of the Child?, 11 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 360, 366 (1997). 
109 R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 24(1) (1990) (Can.). “The merits of an 
application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be 
determined on the basis of the best interests of the child.” Id. 
FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC 2/21/02 7:41 PM 
76 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
determined on the basis of the best interests of the child. In a 
given case, a court analyzes what best promotes the integrity of 
the child and what constitutes harm for the purposes of limiting 
or denying custody or access. In so doing, the court considers all 
the child’s needs and circumstances according to Section 24(2) of 
the Children’s Law Reform Act,110 including such matters as 
blood relationships, stability of the family unit, parental abilities, 
and the child’s views. The approach is one of case-by-case 
decision-making, which has the advantage of acknowledging the 
uniqueness of each child,111 but has the disadvantage of being 
                                                          
110 Id. at § 24(2): 
In determining the best interests of a child for the purposes of an 
application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a 
child, a court shall consider all the needs and circumstances of the 
child including, 
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and, 
(i) each person entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the 
child, 
(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the 
child, and 
(iii) persons involved in the care and upbringing of the child; 
(b) the views and preferences of the child, where such views and 
preferences can reasonably be ascertained; 
(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home 
environment; 
(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of 
the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the 
necessaries of life and any special needs of the child; 
(e) any plans proposed for the care and upbringing of the child; 
(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is 
proposed that the child will live; and 
(g) the relationship by blood or through an adoption order between 
the child and each person who is a party to the application. 
Id. 
111 In the Supreme Court of Canada’s Young v. Young decision, [1993] 4 
S.C.R. 3, 117, Madam Justice McLachlin (now Chief Justice) stated: 
It has been left to the judge to decide what is in the “best interests of 
the child,” by reference to the “condition, means, needs and other 
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vague: 
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less 
ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself. Should 
the judge be primarily concerned with the child’s 
happiness? Or with the child’s spiritual and religious 
training? Should the judge be concerned with the 
economic productivity of the child when he [or she] grows 
up? Are the primary values of life in warm, interpersonal 
relationships, or in discipline and self-sacrifice? Is 
stability and security for a child more desirable than 
intellectual stimulation? These questions could be 
elaborated endlessly. And yet, where is the judge to look 
for the set of values that should inform the choice of what 
is best for the child?112 
While in theory the best interests test offers flexibility to 
include a child’s cultural and religious background, its 
application in judicial decisions reflects and perpetuates 
stereotypes of the “normal” family. Moreover, the indeterminate 
nature of the best interests standard has been criticized for hiding 
more than it reveals. Judges have so much discretion that they 
make decisions based on personal biases and unsupported 
assumptions, thereby imposing mainstream cultural norms and 
values that may be inconsistent with those of a minority group.113 
                                                          
circumstances” of the child. Nevertheless, the judicial task is not one 
of pure discretion. By embodying the “best interests” test in 
legislation and by setting out general factors to be considered, 
Parliament has established a legal test, albeit a flexible one. Like all 
legal tests, it is to be applied according to the evidence in the case, 
viewed objectively. There is no room for the judge’s personal 
predilections and prejudices. The judge’s duty is to apply the law. He 
or she must not do what he or she wants to do but what she or he 
ought to do. 
Id. 
112 Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in 
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260 (1975). 
113 For a discussion of the best interests of the child principle, see 
Nicholas Bala, The Best Interests of the Child in the Post-Modern Era: A 
Central but Paradoxical Concept, 6(2) SUP. CT. L. REV. 453 (1995); 
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John T. Syrtash has pointedly asked: 
Is the protean nature of the “best interest of the child” test 
an invitation for racism or is its vagueness a good thing, a 
means to invite creative responses to intractable cultural 
conflicts? Most importantly, to what extent does a judge 
impose his [or her] own cultural values when assessing 
the best interest of a child in any custody or child 
protection proceeding that appears before him [or her]?114 
A survey of jurisprudence by Nicholas Bala and Susan Miklas 
revealed that the biases and values of individual judges play a 
crucial role in determining the “best interests of the child” in 
custody and access disputes.115 As Nicholas Bala remarks: 
Even if reliable prediction were possible, the outcome 
chosen inevitably is a reflection of the personal values, 
judgements and biases of decision makers, and of the 
social class, culture, and institution of which they are 
members. Given the absence of professional and societal 
consensus on what is “best” for a particular child, best 
interests means ultimately accepting the decision-maker’s 
personal philosophy, beliefs, and opinions about children, 
families and child rearing.116 
Further, other scholars argue that this test has been implemented 
in a discriminatory fashion; individuals who depart from a white, 
middle-class, heterosexual normative model have been treated as 
                                                          
Freeman, supra note 108; Mnookin, supra note 112; Bernd Walter et al., 
“Best Interests” in Child Protection Proceedings: Implications and 
Alternatives, 12 CAN. J. FAM. L. 367 (1995). For a critique of the 
appropriateness of the test, see Karen M. Munro, The Incapability of Rights 
Analysis in Post-Divorce Child Custody Decision Making, 30 ALTA. L. REV. 
852 (1992); Stephen J. Toope, Riding the Fences: Courts, Charter of Rights 
and Family Law, 9 CAN. J. FAM. L. 55, 67 (1991). 
114 JOHN T. SYRTASH, RELIGION AND CULTURE IN CANADIAN FAMILY 
LAW 2-3 (Butterworths, 1992). 
115 Nicholas Bala & Susan Miklas, Re-thinking Decisions about Children: 
Is the “Best Interests” of the Child Approach Really in the Best Interests of 
Children?, Paper presented at the National Family Law Program in 
Charlottetown, Canada, June 5, 1992. 
116 Walter et al., supra note 113, at 380. 
FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC 2/21/02 7:41 PM 
 CULTURE IN FAMILY LAW ADJUDICATION 79 
“deviant” by legal decision-makers.117 
Y.J. v. N.J. perpetuates notions of the “normal” family that 
have become legitimized through biased legal discourse. In 
resolving the application for custody, the Ontario Court of Justice 
relied entirely on an assessment report, prepared pursuant to 
Section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act,118 by Dr. Graham 
Berman, a child psychiatrist at the Hospital for Sick Children in 
Toronto.119 In his decision, the judge chose to rely on some 
aspects of the assessment report rather than others. The chosen 
excerpts defined and constructed notions of normalcy and the 
child’s best interests.120 In these excerpts, Dr. Berman did not 
take into account or even mention that he was describing a 
Muslim girl born in the particular context of an extended 
family.121 The significance of cultural and religious differences 
                                                          
117 See Katherine Arnup, Mothers Just Like Others: Lesbians, Divorce 
and Child Custody in Canada, 3(1) CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 18 (1989); Marlee 
Kline, Child Welfare Law, “Best Interests of the Child” Ideology and First 
Nations, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 375 (1992); Marlee Kline, Complicating the 
Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation Women, 18 
QUEEN’S L.J. 306 (1993); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The 
Best Interests Test and the Costs of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-91). 
One jurist came to the conclusion that the application of the best interests of 
the child test has led to the cultural genocide of Manitoba’s aboriginal 
population. See Associate Chief Judge E.C. Kimelman, No Quiet Place, 
Report of the Review Committee on Indian and Metis Adoptions and 
Placements, Manitoba Community Service (1985). 
118 Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 30(1) (1990) (Can.) 
(stating that “[th]e court before which an application is brought in respect to 
custody of or access to a child, by order, may appoint a person who has 
technical or professional skill to assess and report to the court on the needs of 
the child and the ability and willingness of the parties or any of them to satisfy 
the needs of the child”). 
119 Y.J. v. N.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 14. 
120 Id. (praising the custodial family as providing the “love and support of 
parents and brothers”). Drawing on the work of Carol Smart, Professor 
Beaman has noted: “Experts construct notions of the normal, and medical and 
‘psy’ discourses work to cure the abnormal. Law colludes with these 
discourses through the use of expert testimony.” Beaman, supra note 71, at 
180. 
121 See Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 14. 
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was not addressed. The best interests of the child were identified 
using a partial, limited lens, one suited to a gaze that illuminates 
some aspects of the picture while obscuring others. Only part of 
S’s history was told. 
Underpinned by the idea that the nuclear family is the only 
normative value system, Dr. Berman stated that “[p]reservation 
of the continuity of this family and its successful function must be 
the first consideration in supporting the child’s interests.”122 The 
family in the Canadian and American collective and selective 
imagination is defined as the nuclear family, which is deemed a 
site of stability, happiness, love, and support.123 “[I]ts power,” 
Susan Boyd has argued, “has been, and is, very strong as a 
model held up to us as ideal.”124 The mythical image of the 
nuclear family was so strong in Y.J. v. N.J. that it went 
unmentioned—it was assumed as the unstated norm. And the 
norm is found unequivocally to serve the best interests of the 
Muslim girl, even though this specific child was not born in the 
traditional family model accepted in Canadian society and law.125 
                                                          
122 Id. 
123 For a feminist analysis of the dominant image of the heterosexual, 
middle class “nuclear family” in modern western societies, see MICHÈLE 
BARRETT & MARY MCINTOSH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY (Verso 1982); 
Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Law, Gender and Ideology, in LEGAL THEORY MEETS 
LEGAL PRACTICE (A. Bayefsky ed., 1988); Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Paradise 
Lost, Paradise Revisited: The Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, 
Lesbian, and Gay Engagement with Law, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 589 (1993). 
For an analysis of the ways in which the law of marriage perpetuates women’s 
economic dependence within the family, see CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT 
BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRIARCHAL 
RELATIONS (Routledge 1984). 
124 Susan Boyd, Some Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analyses of 
Law, Family and State: Ideology and Discourse in Child Custody Law, 10 
CAN. J. FAM. L. 79, 91 (1991). 
125 Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 12. The court draws a distinction 
between “our” conception of marriage and the Islamic conception involved in 
the case in the following manner: 
Under Islamic law, there are said to be two types of permissive 
marriage: The first being a permanent marriage, as exists between the 
respondents, which is the legal and traditional marriage recognized in 
Canadian society. The second being a temporary marriage. A 
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In Y.J. v. N.J., the concept of “family” contained an 
assumption that there is such a thing as a “true,” “real,” 
“normal” model of relationships, namely the nuclear family, 
rendering marginal or deviant any other family model. Thus, the 
importance of “the continuity of this family” in Dr. Berman’s 
report became crucial and self-evident as a reference to the 
“natural/normal” way of bringing up children.126 The young, 
single biological mother who is a temporary wife has no role to 
fulfill. In the eyes of the court, Y’s intrusion would have led to 
the stepmother’s hostility and would have caused familial 
instability: “The emotional meaning of such an intrusion for Mrs. 
J. and, perhaps, the risk to the family should there be a 
resurgence of the relationship between Mr. J. and Ms. J. would 
put the welfare of S. at risk.”127 
The court’s message is that, in spite of the different context, 
or indeed because of it, the construction of the family and the 
determination of the best interests of the child shall remain 
universal. The decision in Y.J. v. N.J. represents the power of 
law to ignore differences and to render invisible the cultural 
Other. By characterizing the custody and access issue in a 
manner that minimizes the nature of the extended and bigamous 
family, the court’s legal method maintained, operationalized, and 
serviced order. The intersection of law with purportedly objective 
knowledge that produces Western views of the family, denies 
autonomy to Muslim people in general and to Muslim women in 
particular, whose experiences and perspectives on the notion of 
family may differ. 
                                                          
temporary marriage or Mutah [sic] is an oral agreement time limited 
and resolvable on such terms as the parties thereto themselves decide 
upon. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
126 Id. at ¶ 14. 
127 Id. 
FOURNIERMAC1-22.DOC 2/21/02 7:41 PM 
82 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
C. Denial of Access Under Special Circumstances: The 
Muslim Mother as a Sexual Threat 
Il y a nulle parité  entre les deux sexes quant à la 
conséquence du sexe. Le mâle n’est mâle qu’en certains 
instants, la femelle est femelle toute sa vie ou du moins 
toute sa jeunesse; tout la rappelle sans cesse à son sexe.128 
 
The court’s reasoning behind its conclusion that the biological 
mother in Y.J. v. N.J. should be denied access to her daughter 
belies the true basis of its holding. Generally, it is assumed that 
access129 to the non-custodial parent is in the best interests of the 
child. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, “[a] child 
should be with someone who fosters the relationship between him 
or her and the non-custodial parent.”130 Access gives the child an 
opportunity to maintain or establish a full and meaningful 
relationship with both parents, so the rule is to allow access 
unless there is evidence of harm or absolutely no benefit from 
contact. 
Increasingly, courts are willing to reintroduce a parent into a 
child’s life after an extended absence if the parent has a genuine 
desire for a relationship with the child.131 Lack of contact, in 
itself, is not a reason to deny access unless evidence shows that 
the parent would have a bad influence on the child or that he or 
she repudiated the relationship with the child.132 Yet the Ontario 
Court of Justice in Y.J. v. N.J. did not even state S’s right to 
develop a relationship with her biological mother, who had a 
genuine desire to contribute to the child’s well-being. Rather, the 
                                                          
128 This quote, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, ou l’education 
(1762), book 5, translates into English as follows: “There is no parity between 
the two sexes as to the consequence of sex. The male is only male in certain 
instances; the female is female all her life or at least all her youth; everything 
constantly reminds her of her sex.” 
129 Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C-12, § 20 (1990) (Can.) 
(defining access as the right to visit with and be visited by the children). 
130 Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] S.C.C. 60, at ¶ 23. 
131 See F.(S.M.) v. M.(J.), [1997] W.D.F.L. 760 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
132 See Keeping v. Pacey, [1996] W.D.F.L. 896 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
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court said that because the child did not know her biological 
mother, no access should be granted: 
Most of the authorities counsel cited to me were cases 
where the child knows and has an established relationship 
with each parent. The court then is required to weigh and 
balance the competing factors or, if you will, choose 
between the lesser of two evils or the least detrimental of 
two alternatives. That is not the situation here where the 
child does not know and has no relationship whatsoever 
with her biological mother and where the granting of any 
access creates a real risk for the child.133 
The judge failed to mention, however, that S had already 
been introduced to her biological mother on seven to nine 
different occasions, and that, according to Y’s testimony, S 
highly enjoyed the time they spent together.134 In the assessment 
quoted by the court, Dr. Berman acknowledged how terrible it 
would be for Y to have no access to her daughter: “Under most 
circumstances I would consider it reasonable to introduce a 
relationship with the birth mother since S’s secure attachment and 
emotional resilience could easily accommodate it. Not to have 
such a relationship would also represent a tragic loss for Ms. J., 
who certainly deserves sympathetic consideration.”135 But for Dr. 
Berman, denial of access was justifiable on the basis of 
unreasonable special circumstances: 
There are, however, special circumstances which compel 
much caution in this case. First, the emotional security of 
the custodial family may be jeopardized by the presence 
in their lives of Ms. J. And secondly, to mandate a 
relationship which would interfere with the migration 
plans of the J. family would represent a potentially 
destructive impingement on their autonomy. 
The emotional meaning of such an intrusion for Mrs. J. 
and, perhaps, the risk to the family should there be a 
                                                          
133 Y.J. v. N.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 16. 
134 Id. at ¶ 9. 
135 Id. at ¶ 14. 
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resurgence of the relationship between Mr. J. and Ms. J. 
would put the welfare of S. at risk. On the other hand, to 
require a relationship between Ms. J. and S., while it 
would be the humane decision for Ms. J., would not bring 
any easily predictable benefit for S., notwithstanding the 
goodwill and excellent personal characteristics of Ms. J., 
it would be putting S. at risk in the interests of Ms. J.136 
Adopting these findings, the court ruled on the basis of 
Islamic difference. Justice Walsh underscored in his judgment 
that “this is not the usual situation encountered in most custody 
and access cases of separated parents.”137 His underlying 
argument appeared to be that a potential resurgence of the 
relationship between Y and N would emotionally hurt N’s wife. 
Thus, denial of access rested not so much on the best interests of 
the child S, but rather on the best interests of S.J. One section of 
the decision in particular illustrates this point: 
[N] freely admitted that the move to Africa would result 
in an ocean being placed between the applicant and S. but 
felt this would maintain the stability of his family by 
giving his wife peace of mind by knowing that the 
applicant, whose presence in their lives highly disturbs 
her, was a continent away. 
She does not feel that the applicant should have access to 
S. as there is no goodwill or good faith left between them 
and this would cause confusion and problems for all three 
children and jeopardize the stability of their family which 
is presently very healthy and robust. She also feels access 
may well result in a resumption of the relationship 
between her husband and the applicant. With good cause, 
she trusts neither her husband nor the applicant in this 
regard.138 
One is struck by the ways in which the court portrayed the 
Muslim biological mother. She is assumed to be a sexual 
                                                          
136 Id. (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at ¶ 15. 
138 Id. at ¶¶ 12-13 (emphasis added). 
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temptation putting the stability of the custodial family at risk. 
Instead of focusing on the man, who made the offers of three 
temporary Islamic marriages, the court presupposed that if Y 
were to develop a relationship with her daughter, Y’s mere 
presence would lure and irresistibly attract N. By denying the 
mother-child bond, the stability of the custodial family is 
ensured. In other words, once she is out, their world is saved. 
The judge chose not to emphasize that N, as Y’s Sunday 
school teacher, was the one who initiated their relationship. He 
told his student that he was unhappy in his marriage and was 
getting divorced. He showed her books on muta and presented 
the institution as a form of dating within an Islamic framework. 
He entered into the first temporary marriage in 1985, when he 
was thirty-five years old and Y was eighteen years old.139 He 
contracted his second temporary marriage three years later, and 
ended it while Y was pregnant.140 As to the third temporary 
marriage, it occurred in the summer of 1993 when Y came to 
Toronto and asked to visit her daughter.141 
In Y.J. v. N.J., the court held that no order for access should 
be made because the introduction of her biological mother would 
create a potential for harm to S’s best interests.142 Yet, inspection 
of the judge’s reasoning reveals his true unstated anxiety: that the 
Muslim woman would sexually threaten the rightful wife and tear 
apart the custodial family. The decision is questionable even in 
traditional legal terms since the prominence it gives to S.J.’s 
concerns about her husband’s sexual discipline is excessive. As 
stated subsequently by the Supreme Court of Canada in a less 
“unusual” case involving an extramarital affair, “[a] trial judge 
cannot give custody to a father merely because his wife is a good 
mother. Her presence is a factor but, overall, the court must 
consider if the applicant would make a good father in her 
                                                          
139 Id. at ¶ 3. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at ¶ 8. For a presentation of the facts from Y’s point of view, see 
Shahnaz Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism: Muta and the Canadian Legal 
System, 8 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 249, 254 (1995) [hereinafter Khan, Race, 
Gender, and Orientalism]. 
142 Y.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 17. 
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absence.”143 N was not adequately abstracted from his family. 
The error is all the more egregious when applied to an issue of 
access, which can always be supervised to minimize conflict. 
More fundamentally, the faulty legal approach that denied Y 
all contact with her child can be traced to the judge’s lack of 
appreciation of the cultural context. Instead of avoiding the 
significance of Shia Islam, the court should have explored the 
meaning of this religion for all parties to the dispute using a 
functional rather than an unstated norm-based analysis. Context 
must replace subtext. Had the judge brought a functional 
approach to bear on the matter, S’s best interests would not have 
been defined to exclude time with her mother. Y was punished 
for participating in a cultural practice that empowers men, but 
not women, to have sexual relationships outside their primary 
marriage. 
The judge could have taken an internal perspective on the 
institution of muta and achieved a more nuanced understanding of 
a relationship far more complex than Western “adultery.” The 
“traditional” concept of infidelity is not applicable, nor is 
“normal” monogamy.144 For one thing, as the court noted, 
children born out of a muta marriage are considered legitimate in 
Shia Islamic law. This indicates that different considerations 
should apply to ascribing responsibility for the tension that results 
between principal and temporary wives. The court’s ruling goes 
against the best interests of S by depriving her of a relationship 
with her mother in order to protect her father. The real harm it 
addresses is not prospective resumption of N’s offers to Y of 
muta marriage (propositions that could still happen with other 
women), but rather the existence of the dangerous liaison in the 
first place. It should never have happened. The judge negates Y’s 
personhood by obliterating her presence in S’s life and by 
                                                          
143 Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] S.C.C. 60, at ¶ 30. 
144 I note that polygamy is exceptional within the Islamic faith: “[I]n 
Muslim countries the vast majority of marriages are monogamous.” See 
Patrick Parkinson, Taking Multiculturalism Seriously: Marriage Law and the 
Rights of Minorities, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 473, 497 (1994) (quoting a 
submission by the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils to the Australian 
Law Reform Commission). 
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substituting the illusion of a normal family. The little girl will 
never know her difference. 
D. Protection Against Harm: What is Harm Anyway? 
The issue of racism is fundamentally about the power of 
the mass and the shared belief system; the power to shape 
reality in accordance with one’s values; the power to give 
voice to or to silence the diversity of others. . . . Judges 
must be certain that their ethnocentrism is not the filter 
being used to evaluate another community’s cultural 
norm.145 
 
In the preceding section, I challenged the court’s depiction of 
the potential harm to S. Harm as a legal notion in family law 
deserves further scrutiny. Is the potential harm derived from S’s 
birth into a different and unfamiliar culturally-defined 
community? Should the harm-based best interests test be adapted 
to the particular context of an extended family? 
According to the best interests test, the well-being of children 
is assured by the absence of harm. The best interests test does not 
define what “harm” means. It merely suggests that “harm” is 
opposed to the best interests of the child. Shauna Van Praagh has 
written that it “is evident . . . that ‘best interests’ and ‘harm’ are 
both terms with open-ended definitions and, further, that they 
operate as sides of the same coin, both used to justify a judge’s 
decision as to the scope of the custody and access.”146 Again, 
ideological assumptions concerning what is best for children, and 
in this case who the better mother is, are bound up in idealized 
family models. Susan Boyd reminds us that “[m]others who 
depart from the norm—whether sexually or in terms of work or 
lifestyle—often have trouble persuading the judge that it is in the 
                                                          
145 Joanne St. Lewis, Racism in the Judicial Decision-making Process, in 
8:2 CURRENT READINGS IN RACE RELATIONS 15, 17 (1994). 
146 Shauna Van Praagh, Religion, Custody, and a Child’s Identities, 35 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 309, 335 (1997). 
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best interests of their children to be with them.”147 In Y.J. v. 
N.J., refusal to grant Y any visitation rights was based on the 
harm associated with her presence within a so-called stable 
family, but the court was vague about what harms Y would 
cause. Justice Walsh’s analysis went as follows: “The J.’s are 
very competent parents and any intrusion, particularly, such as 
the introduction of access into their well-functioning family, 
creates a potential for harm to S. which otherwise does not 
exist.”148 
As in Kaddoura v. Hammoud,149 the characterization of issues 
in Y.J. v. N.J.150 was embedded in numerous underlying but 
unstated assumptions. Even though he did not incorporate 
religious evidence, Justice Walsh nevertheless attempted to 
examine the legitimacy of children born during a muta marriage: 
While any children born out of temporary marriages are 
not considered illegitimate by Islamic law, the evidence of 
S.K. would indicate that such marriages are not looked 
upon with favor within the Moslem community generally 
and there is often a stigma attached to such marriages and 
the children of such marriages.151 
He invoked stigma based on testimony by an expert witness, 
Canadian sociologist Shahnaz Khan.152 
To what extent did the notion of social stigma for S influence 
the denial of custody and access to the biological mother? And 
was the stigma really one imposed by the “Muslim community” 
or one translated from the majoritarian definition of legitimacy? 
Tellingly, Khan struck a very different note when later critiquing 
the case for its Orientalist assumptions: 
                                                          
147 Susan Boyd, Employed Mothers, Lifestyles, and Child Custody Law, in 
CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 265 (Susan Boyd, ed., 1998). 
148 Y.J. v. N.J., (1994) O.J. No. 2359, at ¶ 17. 
149 [1998] D.L.R. (4th) 503. 
150 (1994) O.J. No. 2359. 
151 Id. at ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
152 For concerns about the role of expert witnesses in the context of 
culturally-based legal disputes, see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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Normative Canadian traditions contain Orientalist stereo-
types about the Muslim community as “Other” and as 
homogeneous. In making his decision based on the 
likelihood of Y.J.’s ostracism from the community, it 
appears the judge wished to secure a place for S. within a 
single-visioned Muslim community. In a sense, this notion 
of community, a creation of racist stereotypes, was that of 
an unchanging community with no internal contradictions 
and challenges.153 
In referring to a potential social stigma imposed by the 
“Muslim community” on both the biological mother and the 
child, but not on the father, for having been involved in an 
Islamic temporary marriage, the judge equates cultural difference 
with harm. Muta becomes the decisive factor. Vague evidence154 
about Muslim people’s beliefs supported the denial of custody 
and access as a way of rendering S “normal,” that is, “not 
stigmatized.” In other words, the best interests of the child could 
only be secured by silencing the role of the muta in the lives of Y 
                                                          
153 Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 259; see 
also supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
154 Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 258. Khan 
mentions that the Court did not let her comment on the issue of the applicant’s 
access to her child: 
As a Muslim social scientist, I do not draw my expertise from a 
religious base alone, nor do I fit the stereotypes of one who adheres 
to religious prescriptions. In allowing me to testify the judge, I 
assume, was trying to be culturally sensitive. Yet despite my 
qualifications and experience in psychological assessment, he did not 
allow me to comment on the main issue, [Y]’s access to the child. 
Instead, he marginalized my comments to the cultural aspect or the 
topic of Muta. It is significant that when [Y]’s lawyers approached 
me they wanted me to do an assessment. But it was clear from their 
comments that they wanted a woman who would talk about the 
sexism of Muslim culture/religion and how it continues to oppress 
women. I countered that to take such a position would lead to more 
racism against Muslims and would provide only a partial picture, 
which would leave out the devaluation and marginalization of 
Muslims within Canadian society. 
Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 259. 
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and her daughter. Khan points out that such reasoning is 
misguided: 
The judge and others within the Canadian legal system 
involved in this case did not understand muta and it 
appears that they did not wish to do so either. The 
implications of muta in [Y]’s case were largely ignored 
and the dispute was treated as if muta had not occurred 
and did not exist. Thus for [Y] her dispute became a 
multi-sided struggle—not only against community and 
family pressures, but also against the ethnocentrism of a 
legal system that considered the institution of muta and its 
implications to be inconsequential.155 
I partly disagree, since in my view muta was supremely 
consequential in this case. Without it the judge could not have 
used his notion of stigma to define potential harm to S. 
Mainstream “illegitimacy” arising out of an extramarital affair 
would not have been legally acceptable as a bar to maternal 
access. As the legal anthropologist Max Gluckman observed, 
“[legal] [c]oncepts are absorbent in that they can draw into 
themselves a variety of raw facts of very different kind. They are 
also permeable, in the sense that they are at any one time 
permeated by certain principles, presumptions, prejudices and 
postulates, which the judges hold to be beyond question.”156 
A powerful myth of law is that it stands outside the social 
context and operates in a neutral, universal, and objective 
manner. We can no longer negatively compare minority groups’ 
religious beliefs and behaviors to the “norm” of mainstream 
society without stating and questioning the content of this norm. 
Once we disrupt assumptions embedded in legal discourse, we 
can escape the constriction of norms. Judges will then be free to 
multiply the frames of reference and perspectives through which 
legal method is constructed and applied. 
In Y.J. v. N.J., production of legal knowledge about the 
racialized Other was inscribed within a specific majoritarian 
                                                          
155 Khan, Race, Gender, and Orientalism, supra note 141, at 257. 
156 MAX GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1965), 
quoted in Riles, supra note 66, at 639. 
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milieu. The decision was based on unstated norms shared by 
dominant society, making assertions of universality little more 
than a mirage. Throughout the judgment, the Muslim woman Y 
was depicted as abnormal because of her difference. She 
symbolized muta, polygamy, and instability. In the Othering 
process, the court polarized her position from that of the 
opposing parties. They, although Muslims, were portrayed as 
having assimilated into the mainstream of Canadian society, as 
part of a monogamous, stable, and nuclear family. Marked as the 
Other, Y was pushed out of the prevalent notion of “what is a 
family.” When the universalization of the dominant group’s 
experience and perspective is established as the norm, as in this 
case, whoever falls outside its borders risks losing her claim by 
definition. As long as this norm is not stated and challenged, the 
active marginalization and disempowerment of minority people 
will remain invisible yet pervasive. 
E. Muta in California: The Objective Fallacy Allows Bad 
Faith to Triumph 
As with the Mahr, the courts of the United States have also 
confronted the institution of muta. An appellate court in 
California adopted a universalist approach in its 1988 decision, In 
re Vryonis.157 The appellant, Speros Vryonis, a non-practicing 
member of the Greek Orthodox Church, was the director of the 
Center for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California, 
Los Angeles.158 The respondent, Fereshteh Vryonis, a Shia 
Muslim and a citizen of Iran, met Speros when she was a visiting 
professor at the Center in 1979.159 In 1982, the couple began to 
date, but Fereshteh repeatedly expressed her concern that under 
the tenets of her religion she needed marriage or commitment in 
order to see Speros.160 On March 17, 1982, she conducted a 
private marriage ceremony for the two of them that conformed to 
                                                          
157 248 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
158 Id. at 809. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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the requirements of muta.161 According to the court, “Fereshteh 
was unfamiliar with the requirements of American or California 
marriage law. However, she believed the ceremony created a 
valid and binding marriage, and Speros so assured her.”162 The 
court noted that the relationship was kept secret, that all “usual 
indicia” of marriage were lacking,163 and that the bond 
subsequently deteriorated to the point that the couple spent no 
nights together in 1984. 
In July of that year, Speros, who had not stopped dating other 
women, informed Fereshteh that he was going to marry someone 
else, which he did in September.164 As a result, Fereshteh began 
telling others about the marriage ceremony she had performed 
two years earlier, and, in October 1984, she went to court 
seeking spousal support and a determination of property rights.165 
The trial court found in Fereshteh’s favor under the “putative 
spouse doctrine,” “based upon the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to an alleged marriage entered into in good faith.”166 
This judgment was overturned on appeal because Fereshteh’s 
belief was held to be objectively unreasonable.167 The appellate 
court effectively defined Fereshteh’s perspective as too 
irrational—too Oriental—for Western legal relief to be granted: 
                                                          
161 Id. 
162 Id. The court added: “On frequent occasions, Fereshteh requested 
Speros to solemnize their marriage in a mosque or other religious setting, 
which Speros refused.” Id. 
163 The couple “did not cohabit, or hold themselves out as husband and 
wife, and in no way approximated the conduct of a married couple.” Id. at 
814. Azizah al-Hibri points out that some putatively objective indicia of 
Western marriage are in fact based on assumptions incompatible with Islamic 
marriages. For example, the concepts of merged bank accounts and a common 
surname, mentioned by the court to be lacking in Vryonis, are opposed to 
widespread Muslim practice. See Azizah al-Hibri, Issues Regarding Family 
Law Affecting American Muslims, Paper presented to the NGO Forum, United 
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Huairou, China, Sept. 7, 1995, 
available at http://www.zawaj.com/articles/challenges_women_4.html. 
164 Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 809. 
165 Id. at 809-10. 
166 Id. at 810. 
167 Id. at 813-14. 
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Because the parties made no colorable attempt at 
compliance [with the procedural requirements], Fereshteh 
could not reasonably believe a valid California marriage 
came into being. Fereshteh’s ignorance of the law does 
not compel a contrary conclusion. Further, her reliance 
on Speros’s assurances is unavailing.168 
The court, making no attempt to dispel its own ignorance of 
the Islamic law of muta, reified a majoritarian legal category, as 
did the courts in the Mahr cases that evaluated claims based on 
contract or prenuptial agreement principles. Its simple holding 
was that “[a] belief [that] one’s marriage conforms to the 
precepts of one’s faith is insufficient to come within the [putative 
spouse] doctrine.”169 Because “the facts were at odds with the 
formation and existence of a valid marriage pursuant to 
California law, Fereshteh could not reasonably rely on Speros’s 
statements to believe she was married. Notwithstanding 
Fereshteh’s sincerity, her belief was unreasonable and therefore 
not in good faith.”170 The irony of the court’s dual use of the 
word “faith” to represent both Fereshteh’s religion and her belief 
in marriage is striking, since the judgment essentially ruled that 
her Islamic beliefs were “not in good faith.” This implies an 
unstated norm that the Muslim faith is not a “good” or accepted 
one. 
The universality and neutrality of the law has no patience for 
“unsolemnized, unlicensed and unrecorded” marriages, 
regardless of the relative equities presented by the parties. 
Although Speros lied in bad faith, he was saved by the dominant 
faith, the secular religion of California law and majoritarian 
society, which trumped Fereshteh’s quaint, but patently foreign 
“sincerity.”171 Her claim was not only rejected, but also belittled 
                                                          
168 Id. at 813. 
169 Id. at 815. For the analogous Mahr decisions, see supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
170 Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 814. 
171 This brings to mind the Mahr case of Kaddoura v. Hammoud, [1999] 
168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Gen. Div.), in which the court found the hus-
band’s actions “somewhat offensive and dishonourable.” See supra note 46. 
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as being objectively unreasonable and irrational. Again, the legal 
process silences the Muslim woman, with no functional effort 
made by the court to appreciate her perspective and that of her 
cultural community. 
CONCLUSION 
The cases discussed in this article reveal the process of 
constructing Muslim identity in Canadian and American 
courtrooms and the resulting connotations of Islam in the judicial 
arena. Judges have used majoritarian values to interpret the 
family law issues at stake, thereby projecting the dominant 
society’s experience onto all communities’ members. When 
claims to universality go unchallenged, minority people’s cultures 
are measured against unstated norms and become the abnormal, 
the Other. 
Kaddoura v. Hammoud demonstrates how cultural anxiety 
operates to exclude those perceived as different. Selected people 
are identified with the power to make enforceable contracts; the 
Others are not. Universalist reasoning produces an exclusionary 
result. Muslim culture is treated as an outsider whose specific 
traditions are translated into Otherness. Careful reading of Y.J. v. 
N.J. similarly makes this process apparent. In the eyes of the 
court, N.J., his wife, and their children form a family that is 
“natural and normal” as defined through the lens of Canadian 
identity. Although Muslim, they are almost “Canadian,” but Y.J. 
is not. Y.J. is essentialized as a Muslim woman whose child is 
the result of a marriage with an already married man. Her 
application for custody and access was dismissed because, in 
relation to the “normal” family, she was viewed as deviant and 
different. 
Canadian and American courts operating in our multicultural 
societies often face dilemmas like that of Mahr enforcement or 
muta assessment.172 Unsophisticated approaches in family law to 
                                                          
172 Other jurisdictions are also confronting these issues. See, for example, 
the South African Constitutional Court’s ruling in Amod v. Multilateral Motor 
Vehicle Accidents Fund, 1998 (10) SA 753; 1998 (10) BCLR 1207 (CC) 
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Muslim differences are deeply troubling. These decisions create a 
category of “Others,” whose claims and experiences are denied 
and excluded through legal discourse. Legal method is deemed 
objective, but universalist and cultural relativist approaches 
preserve only the illusion that law produces “truth.” 
The coercive power of law resides precisely in its ability to 
appear neutral when in reality it shapes society in the mold of 
dominant values. Both Canadian and American judicial discourse 
are tainted by Orientalism that is at once horrified and fascinated 
by Muslim women. The Mahr and muta cases demonstrate the 
existence of multicultural challenges to family law, quandaries 
for which I have proposed a contextual remedy, the functional 
approach. Judges need to become more perspicacious when they 
decide culturally complex disputes in this most agonizingly 
personal of legal domains. 
 
                                                          
(considering but not deciding an underlying dispute concerning a claim for loss 
of support by a widow married according to Islamic law). Regarding the new 
South Africa’s changed attitude toward Muslim marriages, see the concurring 
opinion of Justice Sachs in S. v. Solberg, 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC), at ¶ 
152: 
The marginalisation of communities of Hindu and Muslim persuasion 
flowed from and reinforced a tendency for the norms of “Christian 
civilization” to be regarded as points of departure, and for Hindu and 
Muslim norms to be relegated to the space of the deviant “Other.” 
Any echo today of the superior status in public law once enjoyed by 
Christianity must therefore be understood as a reminder of the 
subordinate position to which followers of other faiths were formerly 
subjected. 
Id. 
